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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines Greece’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council [GCC] countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates. Greek-Arab ties have a long history that goes 
back to 1947, when Greece voted against the partition of Palestine in the 
UN General Assembly. In the post-1974 era, these relations have been 
strengthened, reflecting Athens’ efforts to gain support in the dispute 
with Turkey and secure oil supplies. Within the last ten years, such 
security objectives of Greek foreign policy have moved to the 
background and economic priorities have come to the fore. This has 
made relations with the Gulf States a crucial economic and diplomatic 
goal that has not been undermined by its ties to Iran and Israel. While 
the country’s commercial relations with the GCC are regulated through 
the EU framework, it is through bilateral relations that Greece seeks to 
build its ties to the Gulf. Until now, the high expectations cultivated on 
the Greek side have not been fulfilled. Greece’s relations with the GCC 
countries have remained anemic and investment limited. While a 
possible Grexit may have initially dampened investors’ interest, the main 
obstacle continues to be one of domestic nature, reflecting the 
fragmentation and lack of coordination within Greek institutions 
themselves.  
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Looking for an Oasis of Support:  




A recent review of European Union relations with the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) scholarship noted that there is ‘a paucity of studies 
dealing with EU-GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] relations’ (Cavatorta & 
Rivetti 2014). Indeed, this academic neglect has perhaps taken its cue 
from the relative inertia of EU officials in strengthening institutional 
relations with the GCC. A European Parliament Report (2010: 2) noted 
that  ‘the Gulf region (…) has long been neglected by EU policymakers, 
who do not manifest a strong political will towards it’. Also, two 
researchers concluded in 2014 that ‘there is still no concerted EU policy 
in the Gulf beyond the thriving bilateral activities of some EU member 
states’ (Demmelhuber & Kaunert 2014).  
While this picture seems telling, it is now not entirely accurate. Attention 
of European policy-makers and scholars has shifted in the direction of 
the Gulf as a result of the Arab Spring and the spread of the Iraqi conflict 
into Syria. The most recent mass exodus of Syrian and other migrants to 
Europe has increasingly transformed the wider MENA region into a 
source of instability and a growing security threat, resulting from failed 
states and the violent rise of ISIS (after the Paris bombings, increasingly 
referred to as DAESH [Stone 2015]). The crucial role of the countries of 
the Gulf in the fight against Islamic fundamentalism is therefore another 
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factor of growing scholarly interest. Numerous articles, reports and 
books have been published within the last two years on the EU-GCC 
relationship with a prevailing security slant. European diplomatic activity 
increased as well, though it still has not secured concrete multilateral 
agreements. However, the increased academic research output 
continues to be confined either to security and secondarily economic 
aspects of the Gulf’s relations with the West or to the foreign policies of 
a few powerful European countries that have strong and long-
established contacts, agreements and relationships with the region, 
especially with the UK, France and Germany (Legrenzi 2015; Ulrichsen 
2015; Bicchi; Challand & Heydemann 2015).  
While the EU-GCC relationship remains the larger European framework 
for working with the countries in the Gulf, it is through bilateral 
negotiations that smaller EU member states can hope to build concrete, 
cooperative and productive ties in the GCC space.  Until now, there has 
been extremely limited research on the foreign policies of smaller 
European countries towards the region, and on the ways that these 
interact with EU policies.  
This paper aims to partly cover this gap by studying Greece’s relations 
with the GCC area. It attempts to define and analyze the actors and the 
factors that shape the Greek-Gulf relationship and to understand how a 
small European state in the middle of a serious and deep economic crisis 
tries to attract the attention of distant, but economically powerful actors 
within the parameters of the wider European framework.  
The paper proceeds in the following way: the first part examines in brief 
the international politics of the countries of the Gulf, emphasizing on 
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current issues; the second part analyses EU-GCC agreements that 
regulate Greece’s trade relations with the region and presents the main 
challenges that Brussels confronts; the third part presents Greece’s 
bilateral relations with the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, 
starting from a historical perspective but focusing on more recent 
developments. The fourth and final part tries to reach some more 
general conclusions that may be of use in the study of similar cases.   
2. Strategic Challenges in the Gulf  
 
The GCC was formed in 1981. It has been argued that the main impetus 
for its formation at that time was the growing security concern that 
followed the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the start of the Iran-Iraq war 
of 1980 (Pradhan 2011: 265). There was a legitimate worry that post-
revolutionary Iran would spread Shia radicalism to the Gulf countries 
which was additionally fueled by GCC perceptions of Iran as a state 
seeking to play a growing regional role based on its ideology of 
civilizational supremacy.  
Iranian occupation of three disputed islands in the Gulf claimed by the 
UAE has further contributed to GCC views of Iran as a hegemonic actor, 
solidifying concerns that Tehran may attempt to fully control the Strait 
of Hormuz (Pradhan 2011: 267). Iran’s persistence in launching a nuclear 
program has further aggravated the lack of trust, leading GCC countries 
to embark on civilian nuclear programs of their own. Moreover, GCC 
leaders increased military cooperation and political coordination.  
The Arab Spring raised new warning signals for the Gulf putting Iran’s 
behavior and capabilities under the microscope, especially following the 
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uprisings and events in Egypt and Bahrain, in the Eastern Province of 
Saudi Arabia, in Yemen, and Syria. By 2011 an analyst concluded that 
‘the traditional Arab perception of Iran as a dominating and expansionist 
power […] colors the thinking in the GCC countries’ (Pradhan 2011: 274).  
Since then, as the Sunni Arabs have become increasingly marginalized in 
the new Iraq, and as Iran has increased its influence throughout the 
region – especially in Iraq, Syria and Yemen - these perceptions remain 
stronger than ever. Today, the deployment of military forces and the 
provision of arms and money to Iraq and Yemen by both GCC countries 
and Iran indicate that suspicions are running high and relations remain 
tense (Economist 2015).  
To fan the fire of insecurities and military build-up, questions about US 
‘disengagement’ from the region have been worrisome to the GCC states. 
Following decades of active intervention in the area, the United States 
has been attempting to withdraw from the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and strategically pivot toward Asia where the rivalry with 
China is growing. Coupled with increased energy independence as a 
result of hydraulic fracturing, the United States is clearly signaling that it 
is time for its Gulf Allies to take-on new responsibilities (Shayiji 2014). In 
response to these developments, the GCC summit in Doha in 2014 
agreed to ‘a plan to establish a joint military command and joint naval 
force to be based in Bahrain, and supported by an Abu Dhabi-based Gulf 
Academy for Strategic and Security Studies’ (Katzman 2015). 
While the security relationship with the GCC countries remains of pivotal 
importance, there are noticeable differences between the Gulf States on 
a number of policy issues. Of particular concern for Gulf States is the 
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rapidity of the rapprochement and normalization of US relations with 
Iran. The local monarchies hold different views from the Obama 
Administration on several issues but, most important is the American 
rapprochement with Iran: they worry that the recent nuclear deal signals 
‘American acceptance of Iran’s hegemonic regional ambitions’ (Al Shayiji 
2014: 61). There were tensions over the nature of the Arab Spring. Its 
contagion made GCC leaders view it as a threat, while US inhibitions 
turned into support for democracy and freedom, once a number of 
regimes were toppled as a result of the upheaval. Moreover, 
disagreements loomed over policies vis-à-vis Syria, Iraq and Bahrain and 
have made the US-Gulf relationship even more complicated. It is the 
agreement of major powers with Iran on the nuclear question, however, 
and the rapid change of the world community’s relationship with Tehran 
that has increased concerns about the importance of the Gulf’s strategic 
significance for Washington and has led to questions about whether this 
rapid change of stance will prove a wise strategy in the long run for all 
parties involved.  
Disagreements on alliances and foreign policy are also prominent in the 
GCC itself. Qatar, for instance, maintains close relations with Iran and 
has actively supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere 
(Guzansky 2015: 114-5; Colombo 2012: 116-8). At the same time, Saudi 
Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood, a ‘terrorist organization’. The 
UAE has also taken a more assertive stand toward regional Islamic 
movements, particularly when they are linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. On this position, they are aligned with Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain. This specific foreign policy difference with Qatar led the UAE, 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to recall their Ambassadors from Qatar in 
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March 2014. The rift was repaired in November of that same year 
(Katzman 2015), when they all agreed to further coordinate their foreign 
policies in order to avoid working against each other’s interests. The UAE 
would also prefer to separate the issue of the disputed islands from 
economic considerations: after all, the Emirates are Iran’s largest trading 
partner and Dubai is host to around 400,000 Iranian nationals (Guzansky 
2015: 115).  
Oman, with its extensive commercial ties with Iran and its relatively 
modest military capabilities, continually emphasizes its traditionally 
independent foreign policy although it remains an active broker in 
heated disputes. The Sultanate, has decided not to join the tighter Gulf 
Union proposed by the Saudis. Thus, as Guzansky has argued, ‘the 
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia set[s] the Gulf’s security 
agenda, with the smaller Gulf monarchies maneuvering between them’ 
(2015: 119). 
While there are differences, the GCC is not in fact as split in its foreign 
policy agenda as some analysts argue. Most of the Gulf monarchies 
would like to curb Iran’s hegemonic ambitions and limit its exploitation 
of the Sunni-Shiite feuds, because their own ethnic and religious 
composition could leave them exposed to outside interference. Bahrain, 
for example, with its depleted energy resources and its delicate 
sectarian composition (a Sunni minority ruling over a Shiite majority) has 
become a strong supporter of closer cooperation among GCC countries 
(Guzansky 2015: 116). And, several disagreements have been solved 
with the help of Kuwait’s emir who ‘has been active in fence-mending 
mediation’  (Al Shayiji 2014: 68). Moreover, though in the beginning 
  
7 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar had supported different parties and factions 
related to the Arab Spring, gradually their policies converged, leading to 
a ‘division of labor’, a division based on an external/domestic dichotomy: 
‘counter-revolutionary inside the Gulf and pro-revolutionary outside of 
it’ (Colombo 2012: 119). Riyadh took the lead during the Yemeni and 
Bahraini uprisings, leaving Qatar to play the leading role in the Syrian 
revolution. Later Saudi Arabia supplanted Qatar as the leading supporter 
of the Syrian rebels. This convergence of Qatari and Saudi foreign 
policies largely reflected the change of leadership in Qatar (Economist 
2013).  
As the situation in the wider MENA region remains explosive, the United 
States has had to make significant efforts to strengthen the relationship 
with the GCC, creating a US-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum and 
discussing with all six countries as a group, treating the GCC, at least at 
the security level, as one bloc (Al Shayiji 2014: 68).  Other actors, 
however, have been given space to operate with the Gulf, while the US 
remains present but less engaged than in the past. These developments 
offer new opportunities for the European Union and its member states. 
The Europeans have also been encouraged by Washington to undertake 
more responsibilities (especially at the security level) in the region as 
part of ‘burden-sharing’. As early as 1990, Henry Kissinger had noted 
that ‘over a period of ten years, many of the security responsibilities that 
the United States is now shouldering in the Gulf ought to be carried out 
by the Europeans who receive a larger share of oil from the region’ (US 
Senate 1990). Nevertheless, the EU, cognizant of the fact that relations 
at the institutional level have remained static, is more inclined to 
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abandon its multilateral approach and deal with the Gulf monarchies 
individually. 
 
3. The EU and the Gulf  
 
EU-Gulf relations are based on the 1988 Cooperation Agreement that 
went into effect in 1990. The GCC’s establishment of a customs union in 
2003 gave a new impetus to negotiations with the EU, and there was 
hope that the first ever region-to-region Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
would be signed (Antkiewisz & Momani 2009: 218). However, in 
December 2008, the negotiations were suspended, signaling significant 
disagreements. There was renewed hope of success for regional 
cooperation when, in 2010, the Joint Action Program (JAP) was approved 
by the EU–GCC Joint Ministerial Council meeting in Luxembourg. It 
contained fourteen priority areas with suggestions for cooperative 
initiatives (European External Action Service 2010). As a result of this 
program, several projects were initiated creating ‘a variety of networks 
whereby individuals and institutions from the GCC states and the EU 
c[a]me into regular contact to exchange information and expertise’ 
(Koch 2013: 10). However, in 2013, the parties failed to produce a new 
Joint Action Program (JAP). In 2015, the 24th GCC-EU Joint Ministerial 
Meeting was held in Qatar. The final communiqué noted vaguely the 
‘determination to address together common political, social, economic, 
and security challenges’.1  




It is abundantly clear that multilateral cooperation between the 
European Union and the GCC has stalled. The impasse is unfortunate for 
both sides. While both the EU and the GCC could be considered as 
leading examples of regional cooperation and integration, there are 
obstacles and weaknesses that hinder a more productive collaboration, 
even though a strategic dialogue between the parties is warranted 
(Colombo 2015).  
The EU is the first trade partner of the GCC, accounting for 13.8% of its 
total trade in 2014 (followed by China, Japan and India with around 11% 
each). The GCC is the EU’s fifth largest export market. EU-GCC total trade 
increased spectacularly in recent years from €100.6 billion in 2010 to 
€148 billion in 2014. About ¾ of EU imports from the region are fuel and 
mining products, while its exports are manufactured products (mainly 
machinery, transport, equipment, and chemicals). The value of EU 
exports of goods to GCC is almost double the value of its imports. As far 
as the trade in services is concerned, the EU also maintains a surplus 
(€24.3 billion in exports compared with €12.4 billion of imports) 
(European Union 2015).  
Nonetheless, the EU’s share of the GCC trade is falling. In the words of 
an analyst: ‘Six or seven years ago the EU accounted for about 31% of 
Saudi’s imports, but now that is down to 25%, while China has doubled 
its share during the same period’ (EUI 2014: 18). The same is true of 
investment. Traditionally GCC countries have invested heavily in the EU 
(and the United States). However, their investment is mainly of the 
portfolio type (bonds, shares etc.) and, as a result of the recent 
economic crisis in Europe, GCC countries have increasingly been 
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directing their investments to Asia (Toksoz 2010: 205).   
The failure to conclude a Free Trade Agreement has been attributed to 
several factors.  An important issue was EU repeated attempts to include 
political clauses (Demmelhuber & Kaunert 2014: 579). The particular 
push came mostly from the European Parliament that requested a series 
of political reforms in order to endorse such an agreement (Colombo 
2015). On the part of the EU, moreover, the low level of Europeanization 
of EU policies toward the GCC played a negative role in negotiations 
especially since, as previously mentioned, member-states’ bilateral ties 
still dominated the discussion. Another significant aspect that hindered 
an agreement was a condition posed by the EU in order ‘stabilize carbon 
dioxide emissions and improve energy efficiency’. To achieve these aims, 
‘the EC proposed a new energy and carbon dioxide tax aimed at lowering 
imports’ (Colombo 2015). This would adversely impact the GCC countries 
that are fossil fuel exporters. 
Political disagreements aside, there are major areas of dispute between 
the EU and the GCC that impeded progress on the FTA such as tariffs, 
export subsidies, and public procurement. A study funded by the 
Commission concluded that it would be the GCC – not the EU – that 
stands to gain the most from a FTA (PWC 2004: 105). However, rather 
strangely, EU member-states ‘have not contested the EU-GCC FTA’ 
(Antkiewicz & Momani 2009: 222). Two sectors, specifically, dominated 
negotiations: petrochemicals and aluminum. Within the last decades, 
the GCC countries moved away from relying on basic petroleum exports 
and moved into the production of high value-added petrochemicals. 
Thus, the GCC asked for a reduction of the relevant EU trade barriers 
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(PWC 2004: 164).   
Gradually, the main issue in the negotiations became the GCC export 
subsidies to its petrochemical industry. For many years the EU’s 
petrochemical lobby forcefully fought against trade liberalization arguing 
that the double pricing policy of raw materials by GCC countries 
constituted an indirect subsidy that would result in dumped imports 
entering the EU. The European Council of Chemical Manufacturers’ 
Federation exerted significant pressure on the Commission to charge 
GCC countries (especially Saudi Arabia) with anti-dumping measures 
(Antkiewicz & Momani 2009: 227). However, the Saudis managed to 
convince the WTO that export prices reflected added costs. This has put 
an end to EU petrochemical industry’s allegations (European Parliament 
2010: 11).  
The second issue of trade disagreements was related to aluminum. The 
GCC had become a significant producer of aluminum products (almost 
10 per cent of global output) while the EU imposed 6 per cent duty on 
aluminum imports (Antkiewicz & Momani 2009: 224). Any liberalization 
of trade was expected to have adverse effects on the EU aluminum’s 
industry.  
Though some progress was made within the last years, it seems that 
trade continues to dominate the talks. As aptly put by an EU official ten 
years ago, ‘The EU position is that we can offer some compromise and 
give some possibilities, but we cannot allow a completely free hand, 
otherwise it is not a real FTA’ (EUI 2004: 19). Negotiations seem to have 
also stalled because of GCC countries’ ‘lack of transparency in public 
procurement procedures and barriers to entry for foreign investors in 
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the services sector’ (European Parliament 2010: 11). 
A third and important factor for the failure to conclude a FTA was the 
disagreements among GCC members themselves. This is partly related to 
the different benefits that a FTA would bring to them (with Saudi 
Arabian petrochemical industry – especially SABIC – and the Bahrain 
aluminum industry benefitting the most), but it also reflected the 
difficulties of GCC countries to act unanimously. EU officials noted that 
GCC monarchies with domestic social contracts are antithetical to the 
concept of giving supranational authority to the GCC secretariat and, as 
a result, it is ‘structurally difficult to come to an agreement’ (quoted by 
Antkiewicz and Momani [2009: 223]).  
In many respects, the GCC, with its lower degree of institutionalization, 
‘had very little experience in collective diplomacy and interregional 
dialogue and their negotiation team did not have a proper mandate’ 
(Baabood 2003: 274).  
A European Parliament report (2010:20) suggested that, ‘given the 
institutional weaknesses of the GCC Secretariat and the previous 
episodes of regional divisions’, the EU ‘should adopt a hybrid approach, 
consisting in maintaining some relations on a multilateral basis while at 
the same time starting a more substantive approach to the individual 
countries’. In a sense, this was a belated adoption of US economic policy 
in the region that generally preferred signing bilateral FTAs with GCC 
members (Antkiewicz and Momani 2009: 231). 
There continues to be no specific time-horizon for finalizing the FTA 
although events such as the 2013 EU decision to end the system of 
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Generalized System of Preferences for the GCC starting from January 
2014, which led to the taxation of GCC petrochemical exports to the 
Union may ‘pressure the GCC to conclude the FTA’ (Konstandinova 2014: 
10). 
 
4. Greece and the GCC 
 
As the EU and GCC seek ways to restart their inter-regional relationship, 
member states of the European Union cultivate their own ties to the 
region. While it is the United Kingdom, France and increasingly Germany 
who have longstanding ties in energy, security and trade, smaller 
members like Greece have been looking for ways to strengthen their 
relations, especially in the economic sector.  
Greece has traditionally maintained strong ties with the Middle East.  It 
was the only European state, for example, to vote against the partition 
of Palestine in the UN General Assembly in 1947 (Tsakaloyannis 1983: 
128), and since then it has consistently backed the Palestinian cause. 
Even the leaders of the pro-American military dictatorship (1967-1974) 
had refused to grant the US over-flight or ground facilities to supply 
Israel with arms during the 1973 war, while allowing the Soviet planes to 
pass through the Greek airspace for the airlift of military supplies to 
Egypt (Tsakaloyannis 1983: 128). As a result, Greece was excluded from 
the Arab oil boycott.  
In the 1980s, Greece developed even closer relations with the Arab 
world. This largely reflected a policy aimed at gaining support in the 
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dispute with Turkey. Andreas Papandreou's October 1981 decision to 
raise the status of the Athens Information Office of the PLO to the same 
diplomatic level as Israel's representation in Greece (Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives 1982: 31264) was a clear response to Turkey's 
1978 decision to accord a similar diplomatic recognition to Arafat's 
representatives in Ankara (Mackenzie 1984: 19). The PASOK 
government's rapprochement with ‘radical’ Arab regimes (Syria and Iraq) 
aimed, in the words of Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, at ‘detaching 
them from the influence of Turkey’ (Oikonomikos 1987: 8).  Furthermore, 
the diplomatic recognition of the PLO was based ‘on the similarities 
between the Palestinian and the Cyprus tragedy’ (Huliaras 1990: 164).  
Yet there were also economic factors behind the Greek-Arab 
relationship. Since the 1970s some Greek companies had achieved a 
prominent role in the Arab world where they were executing significant 
construction projects. Furthermore, the Arab markets were important 
for the export of Greece's agricultural products. The Arab world 
continued to be the second-largest export market for Greece (after the 
EC) throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.  
In the first half of the 1980s, however, the Greek extreme pro-
Palestinian stance complicated relations with moderate Arab regimes 
(especially in the Gulf) plus Syria and led Athens to gradually adopt a 
‘lower profile’ in the region. In 1988 a Greek diplomat said that ‘even the 
PLO is thinking of recognizing Israel. Why not we?’ (quoted in Ηuliaras 
1990: 173). Finally, in 1990 the newly elected New Democracy 
government granted Israel de jure recognition (Abadi 2000).  
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While the Greco-Turkish relationship and the division of Cyprus remain 
high on the Greek foreign policy agenda these issues have also been 
Europeanized. The entrance of Cyprus in the EU during the wave of 
enlargement that officially ended Cold War divisions on the Continent 
allowed Greece some respite because Cyprus was now a member of the 
European family.  
A constraint to the development of Greece’s relations with GCC 
countries was Athens’ close relationship with Tehran. The fact that Iran’s 
relations with Turkey were strained gave the incentives to Greek foreign 
policy-makers to seek a political rapprochement with Tehran. In 1997 
Iran, Armenia and Greece signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
that included a clause on military cooperation. The Greek Defense 
Minister noted that his country aimed at developing a military 
partnership with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Bulgaria and Russia, ‘that is 
with all countries that have problems with Turkey’ (quoted in Mirzoyan 
2010: 123). Greece’s NATO partners reacted negatively (Stratfor 1999) 
and Armenia finally decided not to join the military bloc (Mirzoyan 2010: 
123). Athens had also second thoughts on the real potential of such a 
military rapprochement, and defence cooperation was largely 
abandoned. However, a trilateral cooperation was established, with 
officials from Armenia, Iran and Greece meeting regularly to discuss 
common projects on energy, transport and investment. Though not 
much was achieved, Iran gradually became an important provider of 
Greece’s energy needs, offering extremely favorable credit terms that 
allowed Athens to buy Iranian oil on 60 days’ credit without the need for 
bank guarantees (Patterson 2013: 134).  In the 2006-11 period, Iran 
ranked first amongst Greece’s oil suppliers (Brakoulias et al 2015). In 
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2011, as major oil companies and banks refused to provide oil credit to a 
bankrupt Greece or asked for high risk premiums because of the 
possibility of Grexit, Tehran agreed to provide a credit line. Thus, Greek 
oil imports from Iran exceeded 50% of the country’s needs (RT News 
2012). However, the 2012 decision of the EU to impose a ban on the 
import of Iranian oil was a major blow for the relationship. Greece, 
which was the EU country that was expected to lose more from the 
embargo, was pressurized by Washington to accept the sanctions 
(Patterson 2013: 134). In the end, Greece as well as Italy and Spain were 
partly successful in persuading their EU partners to grant them a longer 
transition period in order to find alternative supplies. Athens was able to 
replace Iranian oil with imports from Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
(Giumelli and Ivan 2013: 18).  
In parallel, Greece tried to find ways to attract Iranian funds. In October 
2015, an Athens newspaper revealed that the Greek General Secretary 
for International Economic Relations visited Tehran to persuade the 
Iranians to buy Greek government bonds (Ta Nea 2015). It can be argued 
that Greece’s relationship with Iran did not act as a serious constraint for 
the development of ties with the GCC (Interview 1); indeed, it may have 
acted more as a disincentive, since Iran provided much of the country’s 
oil needs.   
Another development that initially seemed to have the potential to 
endanger Athens’ relations with the Arab Word was Greece’s 
rapprochement with Israel. Turkey’s rift with Israel in 2009 hastened and 
intensified cooperation between Israel, Greece and Cyprus (Tziampiris 
2015). However, the relations with Israel that soon expanded into 
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several sectors (ranging from energy to military cooperation) did not 
seem to have a direct impact on relations with the Arab world and the 
GCC in particular.2 This is partly related to Tel Aviv’s relations with the 
GCC: though Israel does not have official diplomatic relations with the 
countries of the Gulf, the common threat, Iran, has led to the 
maintenance of active, albeit tacit, avenues of communication (Guzansky 
2015a). As a result, Greece’s growing ties with Israel have not acted as a 
constraint for cooperation with the GCC. 
 
5. From security to economics 
 
Greece’s adoption of the euro in 2001 coincided with high growth rates 
and a campaign to attract foreign investment. A shift to ‘economic 
diplomacy’ soon became visible. A clear indication of the new priority 
was that the government of Kostas Simitis decided to incorporate 
commercial attachés (employees of the Ministry of National Economy) 
into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While this was a sound decision, it 
remained problematic in its execution. Unfortunately, as we will discuss 
later on, the Ministry of Economy, Infrastructure, Maritime Affairs and 
Tourism continued to maintain the responsibility for foreign direct 
investment, creating a bureaucratic division that has complicated efforts 
to broker important economic deals. Therefore, despite efforts to 
facilitate decision-making and improve coordination, Greek foreign 
                                                          
2 Interview with the Director of the Institute of International Economic Relations, Dr Charalambos 
Tsardanidis, Athens, 14 October 2015.  
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policy remained largely separate from foreign economic policy 
throughout the last fifteen years. 
Because of its traditionally good relations with the Arab world, the 
dominant perception was that relations with Gulf states would 
automatically and naturally produce fruit that would benefit Greece in 
its time of need. The situation, however, was far different. While Greece 
has maintained a pro-Arab stance throughout the last decades, it should 
be underlined that its political and economic ties were largely limited to 
the Mediterranean region. It would, therefore, be a mistake to conflate 
these countries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Libya, to name a few) with 
the Gulf where relations were not as pronounced. Secondly, the past 40 
years have brought about a dramatic transformation of the Gulf 
countries as they have taken over the management of their own energy 
resources and have benefited immensely from a prolonged period of 
high oil prices, rendering them global economic powerhouses and 
leading them to quite different directions from the rest of the Arab 
world.  
Today, these relatively sparsely populated lands have attracted millions 
of people, mostly from Europe, Asia and Africa, that are contributing to 
the diversification of their oil economies with the building of new ultra 
modern infrastructure, the creation of world class universities and 
research centres, and the development of tourism. The Gulf countries 
either as states or at an individual level are major investors all over the 
world, but they are also seeking to work with reliable partners, 
preferably large and established companies, to help them build the 
physical environment and to buy financial and other prized assets in all 
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corners of the globe. They are also attracting the world’s brightest to 
lead in education and innovation in industry, energy, design, health etc. 
Furthermore, in response to the new security environment and the 
growing instability in the wider MENA area, the Gulf States are heavily 
investing in defence and security. Their view of security is not limited to 
traditional arms purchases and defence alliances. Having factored in the 
threats of climate change and their water resource poverty, they are 
exploring ways to ensure food security, as well investing heavily in 
agricultural land all across the planet.  These are the parameters that 
interest them as they seek investment opportunities and a 
diversification of their economic portfolios that no longer rely exclusively 
on the sale of fossil fuels.  
As a member of the EU, Greece’s multilateral economic relations 
inevitably comply with the more general EU-GCC framework.  
Interestingly enough, a possible FTA agreement may not prove beneficial 
to Greek economic interests. Under an FTA agreement, there are two 
economic sectors of vital importance for Greek exports that are 
particularly vulnerable: petrochemicals and aluminum. The next 
paragraphs examine each of them in turn.  
Almost all the crude oil used in Greece, accounting for some 45% of the 
country’s energy needs, is imported. Most of it comes from Middle 
Eastern countries, as well as the Russian Federation (IEA 2014: 220-1). 
The Greek refining industry is dominated by two companies: Hellenic 
Petroleum and Motor Oil Hellas. The Greek state currently owns 35.5% 
of the largest one, Hellenic Petroleum, which is, however, in the process 
of privatization. The companies’ four refineries produce around 575,000 
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barrels a day, providing more than 40,000 jobs, mostly in the wholesale 
and retail sector. Greece is a net exporter of refined products to a 
number of countries (mainly Turkey). It is a strange situation: nearly 38% 
of Greece’s export revenue in 2012 was generated from refined 
products, while crude oil accounted for 24% of the country’s imports 
(Ausick 2015). With decreasing domestic demand (due to the economic 
crisis), Greek domestic refinery production exports have increased in 
recent years. An FTA agreement with the GCC could pose a serious 
challenge for the sector.  
Table 1: Greek Exports to Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. (2004-14) 
Million US $ 
 
Source: ELSTAT, Greek National Statistics, Calculations by the authors.  
The second sector is aluminum. Greece has some of the largest bauxite 
deposits in Europe and has become one of the few European countries 
that has a vertically-integrated aluminum industry where the different 
processing stages (from bauxite to internationally certified end use 
products) are all located in close proximity (especially Boeotia and 
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Central Greece). The industry comprises about 8,000 large and small 
companies that employ around 30,000 people. Aluminum is the second 
most important sector for Greek exports (accounting for 1.3 billion Euros 
or 4.7% of the total)3. The largest company is Aluminum SA, part of the 
Mytilineos Holding company, that has an annual production capacity 
over 170,000 tons of aluminum and 810,000 tons of alumina. It employs 
1,100 workers. High electricity prices have been an area of persistent 
renegotiation and litigation battles with the Greek Public Power 
Corporation.  If an FTA with the GCC were to become a reality this would 
further impact on the competitiveness of the Greek aluminum industry.  
However, and despite the possibility of particularly high costs from the 
signing of a trade agreement, there is no evidence whatsoever that 
Greece has contested the EU-GCC FTA at the initial discussion in the 
Council or at any stage of the negotiations during the past 20 years. The 
authors could not find any reference in official documents (ranging from 
Commercial Attachés’ Reports to communiqués of bilateral or 
multilateral meetings) on the issue.  
In general, the Gulf has not been much of a factor in Greek external 
trade. In 2013, Greek imports from the GCC accounted for 4.6% of the 
total and Greek exports to the GCC for 5.1% of the total. Greece has a 
trade deficit with all GCC countries, with the exception of the UAE. 
Despite a recent rise, Greek exports are very low in terms of value. For 
example, in the case of Saudi Arabia they usually cover ½ to 1/5 of 
                                                          




imports and are limited to very few products, mainly refined oil and 
crystalline limestone (marble). In the case of UAE, next to petroleum 
products, Greece exports furs and leather.   
With Saudi Arabia, political relations are anemic at best. Official visits 
have decreased over the last few years. Moreover, the Joint Ministerial 
Committee that is of crucial importance for promoting relations has not 
met since 1999 (Interview 2). But some Saudi investors have a strong 
presence in Greece. For example, Olayan, Saudi Arabia’s biggest 
investment group, has a long-standing presence in Greece, being one of 
the biggest stakeholders in Greek bottler Coca-Cola HBC and the Chipita 
food company. The Saudis have also participated in the share capital of 
Athens-listed company Flexopack. In late 2014, it was reported in the 
press that Olayan is entering Costa Navarino resort in southwestern 
Peloponnese as the fourth shareholder with an equal stake to those of 
the Konstantakopoulos family (Dokas 2014). Olayan is chaired by Khaled 
Olayan who (with his three sisters) is estimated to control a fortune of 
$12 billion, making him one of the world’s richest people. Khaled’s 
father is Greek. However, these moves are not linked to official contacts. 
In contrast, there were some official initiatives that failed to reach the 
stage of implementation. A proposal of the local Greek embassy to offer 
members of the Saudi Royal Family and government officials visa-free 
entry to Greece was not endorsed by the Greek Foreign Minister 
(Interview 5). Political and economic relations with Yemen and Oman are 
insignificant. Greece’s relations with the GCC countries are centered on 
the UAE and Qatar.  
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Opportunities in tourism, education and health are increasingly 
attracting Greek human capital to these two states. While there is still 
much untapped potential for Greek enterprises as well, the past few 
years have seen investment activity in Greece from both UAE and Qatar. 
The crisis of the past years, however, while offering interesting business 
opportunities for foreign investors has also been characterized by Greek 
government inconsistency. Some projects have moved forward, but 
others have ended up in failure, tarnishing the reputation of Greece as a 
reliable place to do business.  
In May 2014, the UAE announced the launch of a $9.75bn investment 
project in Greece. The project is a joint venture of the Abu Dhabi-based 
Al Maabar International Investment with the Greek shipowner and real 
estate developer Latsis Group (Lamda Development) and the Chinese 
company Fosun. It aims at the redevelopment of the old Athens airport 
(Hellenikon), a site of 6.2 million square meters next to the sea. The 
project is expected to generate around 50,000 jobs (Sambidge 2014). 
However, the SYRIZA-led government that was elected in January 2015 
seemed to have second thoughts. The Minister of Productive 
Reconstruction, Environment and Energy, Panayiotis Lafazanis, told the 
Greek Parliament in February 2015:  
The acquisition of Hellenikon was scandalous and the development plans 
are extremely destructive to the environment. We will review this 
scandalous purchase with the aim of cancelling it (quoted in Glass 2015). 
Nevertheless, it seems that other members of the Greek government did 
not share this position. At the same time, there is much continuity in 
Greek foreign policy in the region, despite the change of government. In 
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March 2015 the new Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias visited the 
UAE and met with the Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan, to discuss ‘ways to bolster relations’ (Gulf News 2015). One 
year before (during the previous New Democracy-PASOK government), 
the UAE Foreign Minister Shaikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan officially 
visited Athens where he co-chaired the second meeting of the UAE-
Greece Joint Ministerial Committee along with Greek Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister, Evangelos Venizelos, in the presence of 
Dr. Sultan bin Ahmed Al Jaber, Minister of State (Gulf News 2015). 
This kind of diplomatic activity, with Greek officials visiting Abu Dhabi 
and Doha, is typical of the crisis years. In 2010, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, met the Greek Prime Minister, George 
Papandreou, in New York at the sidelines of the 65th UN General 
Assembly session. The two leaders attended ‘a visual presentation about 
the Qatari investment opportunities in Greece, and witnessed the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding to set up a joint committee 
between the Qatar Investment Authority and the Greek government 
regarding the Qatari investments in Greece4. In 2011, it was announced 
that Qatar Holding agreed to provide the Canadian-owned European 
Goldfields with $750m to fund the development of two gold mines in 
Khalkidiki, northern Greece. Thus, the Qatari sovereign wealth fund 
became the largest single shareholder in Greece (Rowley 2011). 
However, the investment has divided local residents in Khalkidiki, with 
some fearing environmental damage and a drop in tourism and others 
                                                          
4 Embassy of Qatar in Athens (http://www.qatarembassy.gr/index.php?new_language=2). 
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welcoming the nearly 2000 jobs the investor provided at a time of 
economic crisis and high unemployment. 
Apart from Qatar, there are also investments in Greece from the UAE. In 
2014, two Greek government members – the Minister of Infrastructure, 
Transport and Networks and a Deputy Minister on Development and 
Competitiveness - visited the UAE. Talks included investment, tourism 
and energy cooperation. More recently, Greece has been strengthening 
its ties in the area of defence and specifically in the supply of defence 
materials. There have been a number of official visits to the Gulf and 
particularly the UAE by the Minister of Defense Panos Kammenos.5 
Furthermore, the Abu Dhabi MAR holds shares in the Greek Marfin 
Investment Group (Greek Embassy 2014). The Greek Defence Systems 
company cooperates with UAE’s IGG for the provision of ammunition 
and the Greek Restis Group signed a MoU with the UAE International 
Petroleum Investment Company on energy cooperation. Also, the state-
run Abu Dhabi Investment Council has offered to buy the Astir Palace 
resort in Athens (Shahine 2014). Greek companies have also invested in 
the UAE. The Greek Commercial Attaché in the UAE remarked that 170 
Greek companies are present in the Emirates, mostly in the construction, 
fur, and shipping sectors (Greek Embassy 2014). Among others, Vivartia, 
a member of the Marfin Group, signed an initial agreement with Exeed 
Industries for the production of dairy products, juices and tea in Abu 
Dhabi (Greek Embassy 2014). Reflecting the growing Greek 
                                                          
5 Mohamed bin Zayed receives Greek defense minister, WAM Emirates News Agency, November 9, 




entrepreneurial activity in the country, a Greek Business Council was 
created in Dubai.   
Prolonged fears of a Grexit as well as the imposition of capital controls 
seem to have worried at least some GCC investors, although other policy 
inconsistencies and bureaucratic obstacles acted as stronger deterrents. 
Though the direct impact of a Grexit on the GCC economies was 
considered as ‘minimal’, mainly by affecting the euro’s exchange rate 
against the US dollar, institutional investors and high net worth 
individuals seemed rather worried about the future value of their 
investments in Greece (Augustine 2015). Nevertheless, the Greek 
economic crisis also offered new opportunities. For example, Kuwait's Al 
Ahli Bank bought Piraeus Bank's unit in Egypt, paying $150 million cash 
for a 98.5 percent stake in the business and giving Greece's Piraeus a 
much-needed liquidity boost (Reuters 2015). 
Greek officials, however, seemed undeterred by the negative milieu. The 
Greek Alternate Minister of Tourism, Elena Kountoura, made an official 
visit to UAE in June 2015 trying to attract tourists and investment. In an 
interview she noted that Greece was a ‘strong supporter’ of the 
Schengen visa waiver for the Emirates, which was granted to the UAE in 
the summer of 2015 (Carroll 2015). Other Gulf countries have not 
secured such a waiver.  
Exchanges continue unabated and perhaps some success can be 
achieved from the mere fact that investors in Greece can now acquire 
immediate citizenship by investing 2.5 million euros (assets which can be 
sold only after 3 years) or are granted EU permanent residency by 
putting a deposit worth 250,000 euros into a Greek bank account. If 
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there is any hope, however, of building long-term healthy ties with 
countries in the Gulf, Greece needs to rethink its entire approach to 
investment. Thus far, all attempts to attract investment have been 
riddled by a lack of strategic planning, coordination and continuity, 
resulting in different business deals that rely almost exclusively on 
private relationships.  
However, it should be underlined that GCC investors were until very 
recently almost non-existent in the country (UNCTAD 2012). The Greek 
economic crisis and the fears of Grexit proved insufficient to deter GCC 
investment decisions: new plans were announced and deals 
sealed. Nevertheless, GCC capital in Greece – as in the rest of the EU – 
consists of mostly portfolio investments in deposits, bonds and equities 
(Fürtig 2010: 30). 
Greek construction companies have won several bids in the Gulf, usually 
taking part in bids along with foreign companies undertaking major 
infrastructure projects. The Greek company Ellaktor, owned by the 
Bobolas family, is the leader of a consortium that includes the Indian 
multinational Larsen & Toubro, the Turkish companies Yapi Merkezi and 
STFA, and Qataro Al Jaber Engineering; together they won a contract of 
3,9 billion euros for the construction of Doha’s ‘Gold Line Underground’ 
that forms part of the Qatar Integrated Rail Project and is by far the 
largest single construction package of the Doha Metro (Roussanoglou 
2014). This is the largest contract ever signed by a Greek company 
abroad. J&P construction, which has a strong presence in the Middle 
East, has also won several bids for the construction of roads in Qatar and 
other countries of the Gulf.  
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Greek construction companies, however, work mainly as sub-contractors 
in the Gulf, having missed an important wave of opportunities to win 
bids in the Gulf during the period of high oil prices. At that time they 
were all heavily involved in the construction of facilities and 
infrastructure required for the 2004 Olympic games in Athens (Interview 
2).  The first decade of the 21st century saw a record construction push 
in the Gulf that is now significantly slowing down because of low oil 
prices. In addition, companies from India, China and elsewhere have 
already been in the region long enough to form the necessary ties and 
track record to continue to bid and build.   
With direct flights in short supply since the breakdown of Olympic 
Airways, Greece’s flag carrier, Qatar Airways, Emirates of Dubai and 
Etihad of Abu Dhabi, have become important carriers for linking Greece 
with the East. The location of the Gulf is crucial for eastbound flights to 
destinations such as Australia, home to the second-largest overseas 
Greek population. The passenger tally on the Emirates service, for 
example, reached 224.000 in the year through March 2015. Carrying 
seafarers for Greece’s shipping industry has also played a role in these 
increased numbers (Yousef and Weiss 2015).  
Greece has a long history of emigration, and the recent economic 
depression has led to a new exodus. From 2010 to 2013, about 218,000 
Greeks emigrated, according to an estimate from the Greek statistics 
agency (Angelos 2015). Many are highly skilled with degrees in 
engineering and medicine.  It is estimated that around 135,000 have 
post-secondary degrees. The GCC has witnessed an impressive rise in 
Greek migrants. Especially Dubai and Abu Dhabi and to a lesser extent 
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Saudi Arabia and Qatar have become major recipients of Greek 
professionals, mainly working as engineers in the construction sector, 
the hospitality industry and in retail businesses. The majority of migrants 
are skilled laborers who have not brought their families with them, 
hoping to return to Greece soon. The fact that the construction sector is 
highly vulnerable to changes in oil prices means that the emergence of a 
permanent Greek diaspora in the region should not be considered as a 
secure prediction.       
Greece’s relations with GCC countries are characterized by long-
established friendships, networks of personal trust, and connections 
formed by kinship (usually marriage). A few dozen key figures have 
facilitated or impeded relations. Some of them can be found in higher 
echelons of the Greek political class, but most of them derive from the 
private commercial sector.  Some were visible in public life and others 
hidden in agreements that remained secret. Indeed, several Greek Prime 
Ministers, including Papandreou and Samaras, approached the region by 
sending personal envoys. For example, in 2010, when Greece tried to 
settle a four-year dispute with Germany about an allegedly unseaworthy 
submarine, the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou approved the 
sale of 75 per cent of the Scaramanga shipyard near Athens, owned by 
the German company ThyssenKrupp, to Abu Dhabi Mar. Nikos 
Papandreou, the prime minister’s brother, who held no official position, 
was sent to Abu Dhabi to ‘seal’ the deal (Hope 2010). Officials of the 
Greek Foreign Ministry argued that the choice of bypassing the 
diplomatic service was made because of the ‘urgency of the situation’ 
(the German company had decided to sell the shipyard after the 
production of other submarines was canceled). After his trip to the Gulf, 
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Nikos Papandreou told Athens newspapers that ‘I would turn 
somersaults if I had to, in order to rescue Greece’ (Hope 2010a). 
However, it was not the only instance where Nikos Papandreou was 
involved. The same year, he failed to persuade the Qataris to be involved 
in the Liquified Petroleum Gas project in Astakos, Greece.  
General investment pledges by GCC countries to Greece have largely 
failed to materialize because of planning inconsistencies in Greece that 
have led to over-expectations and unfilled promises to investors. For 
example, though the then Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, 
paid €8.5m for 6 Ionian islets (Smith 2013), Qatar withdrew from the 
international tender for the redevelopment of Hellenikon Airport. 
Although Antonis Samaras, Greece’s PM at the time, visited Doha in a 
desperate attempt to persuade Qataris to change their minds and to 
secure new concrete investment pledges (Reuters 2013), he failed.    
 
6. Conclusions 
While Greece has prided itself on having close historic bonds to the Arab 
world (Agnantopoulos 2007), this has proved far from enough for 
promoting collaboration with GCC states. In fact, the region had been 
neglected by Greek foreign policy-makers until very recently.  
As a member of the EU, Greece’s relations with the Gulf inevitably fall 
under the framework of any agreements that may be achieved at a 
multilateral level, even if a particular FTA agreement may not be in 
Greece’s interests. With the important role of the petrochemical and 
aluminum industries for its exports, Greece has much to lose from the 
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liberalization of trade with the GCC. Of course, free trade agreements 
concluded by the EU still require national ratification by each member-
state (Glencross 2009: 188). Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced 
a procedure whereby the European Parliament’s consent is necessary for 
all international agreements the EU makes (Glencross 2009: 104). Thus, 
Greece (and other member states) can exert influence in various stages 
of the process. Still, while an EU-GCC FTA may not be concluded in the 
near future, there remain important questions concerning the impact of 
EU Common External Trade Policy on its poorer members that require 
further study.  
Greece’s belated diplomatic turn toward the Gulf is a result of two 
significant changes in the country’s fortunes and focus. First, and 
foremost, it can be attributed to a clear reprioritization of diplomacy 
toward the fulfillment of the nation’s economic agenda, aiming at 
attracting foreign investment and, to a lesser degree, promoting exports. 
Second, the economic crisis itself has made economic diplomacy a 
matter of paramount importance.  
The systematic cultivation of two relationships reflects this emphasis on 
economic issues: Greece’s rapprochement with China (Huliaras & 
Petropoulos 2014) and the relationship with the Gulf States examined in 
this paper. In both cases, the ties developed within the last decade have 
almost a dominant, if not exclusive, economic dimension. In both, the 
role of private players (businessmen and companies) has been crucial. In 
both, there has been much continuity regardless of the governments in 
power; their objectives and methods have been nearly identical. Above 
all, in both the high expectations have remained largely unfulfilled. 
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Despite some investment activity, mainly of the portfolio type, exports 
remain at low levels. Similarly, attempts to involve the Gulf States in the 
privatization program of public assets has yielded mixed results and 
future outcomes remain to be seen.  
Undoubtedly, the prolonged threat of a Grexit and the imposition of 
capital controls have, in themselves, served as a strong deterrent to 
investment in Greece. It is important to note with regard to Greece-GCC 
relations that Greek ties to Iran and, more recently, to Israel have not 
constrained, impeded or complicated the rapprochement with the 
countries in the region. The main obstacle continues to be one of a 
domestic nature reflecting the fragmentation and lack of coordination 
within Greek institutions themselves.  
Thus far, with regard to investment flows, Qatar and the UAE have 
dominated Greece’s relationship with the Gulf. Foreign investments in 
Greece, mainly of the portfolio type, have come largely from these two 
countries. However, very little of this investment is related to 
government contacts. Official visits have been numerous in the post-
2009 period, but there is no evidence that, apart from a small number of 
instances, they have produced substantial results. The fragmentation of 
policy-making on the Greek side along with the persistent lack of 
coordination among ministries and government agencies dealing with 
foreign economic policy, have proven important constraints on the 
development of a more structured and possibly more successful policy.  
In short, Greek official initiatives have looked spasmodic, lacking clear 
objectives and specific plans. In the words of a Greek diplomat, ‘we 
received no directives from Athens and there was a lack of organization, 
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planning and coordination throughout’ (Interview 2). Greek prime 
ministers and ministers may have visited Abu Dhabi and Doha, helping to 
put Greece on the map, but have not yet produced conclusive results.  
While foreign policy concerns such as the Cyprus problem, relations with 
Turkey, and disputes about the name of FYROM remain at the centre of 
Greece’s diplomatic efforts, increasingly it is economic diplomacy that is 
taking precedence. In order for Greece to have any chance of success, be 
it in its overtures to the GCC or its own recent rapprochement to China 
(Huliaras & Petropoulos 2014), it will clearly need to re-organize 
internally (institutionally first and foremost), to set clear rules and goals 
for attracting foreign investment, and to systematically explore export 
opportunities abroad. Without a clear plan and an institutional overhaul, 
outcomes will be haphazard, and economic relations will continue to be 
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